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OBSERVATIONS OF SINGLE-EVENT MEMORY UPSETS ON THE UOSAT-2 SATELLITE 
Jeff W Ward 
UoSAT Spacecraft Engineering Research Unit 
This paper describes observations of single-event memory upsets 
in the UoSAT-2 satellite Digital Communications Experiment. Two 
years of SEU observations for Harris 6564 memories are 
included, presented both as error rate statistics and as a map 
of satellite orbital location at the time of error occurrence. 
The results presented here are the preliminary observations in 
a long-term single-event upset study funded by ESA-ESTEC. 
INTRODUCTION 
The Spacecraft Engineering Research Unit at the University of Surrey 
(UK) has designed and built two technology demonstration and education 
satellites UoSAT-1 and UoSAT-2. Both satellites were launched into 
low-earth polar orbits by NASA/DELTA (UoSAT-1 in 1981 and UoSAT-2 in 
1984), and both are still operational in orbit. Amongst the many 
payloads carried by UoSAT-2 is a store-and-forward Digital 
Communications Experiment (DCE). The DCE comprises an NSC-800 CPU and 
124 kbytes of CMOS static RAM used for store-and-forward digital message 
transfer. The UoSAT-2 DCE is amongst the first civilian store-and-
forward satellite transponders, and it has demonstrated that inexpensive 
satellite terminals interfaced to standard personal computers can 
participate in a store-and-forward communications network using small 
low-earth-orbiting satellites. [1] [2] [3]. In addition to conducting 
communications experiments, the UoSAT-2 DCE monitors the transient and 
permanent effects of radiation on semiconductor memories. 
DeE MEMORY CONFIGURATION 
TO obtain in-orbit experience with a range of memories of various 
from several manufacturers, the DCE carries the following 
devices: 
Manufacturer Part Chip Size Quantity 
------------ --------- --------
Harris HM-6564 4K X 1 bit 16K X 12 bits 
sizes 
memory 
(equivalent to 48 HM-6504s) 
Harris HM-6516 2K X 8 bit 7 ICs 
Hitachi 6264-LP 8K X 8 bit 8 ICs 
Hitachi 6116-L 2K X 8 bit 16 ICs 
The pOSitioning of these devices within the DCE hardware is discussed in 
[4]. 
SEU MONITORING IN PROGRAM RAM 
Programs and critical data are stored in the Harris 6264 memories. Each 
8-bit data byte in this memory is protected by a 4-bit Hamming error 
detection and correction (EDAC) code. Thus, the memory is 12-bits wide. 
The code used is the standard Hamming (8,12), with distance 3, which can 
detect and correct single-bit errors. Programs, file allocation tables, 
and other frequently-accessed, critical information is stored in the 
EDAC-protected RAM. 
Figure is a block diagram of the Hamming generation and decoding 
circuits. On write cycles, data from the CPU is stored in data RAM, 
and presented to the input of a Hamming code generator. The output of 
the generator is the 4-bit check code, which is stored in code RAM. On a 
read, the stored data is applied to the input of a Hamming generator and 
a correction circuit. The generated code is compared with the stored 
code, and the result of this EXOR addition is also fed into the 
correction circuit. The correction circuit sends an error detect signal 
to the EDAC counter and the corrected data byte is sent to the CPU. An 
important characteristic of this circuit is that when it detects and 
corrects an error, the corrected byte is presented to the CPU, but not 
re-stored in data memory. To remove the upset from memory, the CPU must 
write the byte through the Hamming generator, back into memory. This 
requirement for a read-correct-write cycle influences the design of EDAC 
and SEU logging software. 
The Hamming-based EDAC system can detect and correct any single-bit 
error. If the decoder reads a byte containing more than one bit error, 
that byte will be incorrectly interpreted and either passed on un-
corrected or 'mis-corrected.' For correct DCE operation there must never 
be more than one upset bit in a byte before that byte is corrected by a 
write cycle. Hardware design and software techniques are used to guard 
against such multi-bit errors. 
In hardware, the use of 1-bit-wide memories in the EDAC system 
physically and electrically isolates the bits in a byte from each other. 
Thus, even if a single cosmic particle event upsets several adjacent 
bits in the same memory chip, the upset bits will be spread across 
several different bytes. They will appear to the EDAC system as single 
bit errors and be corrected. A single cosmic ray event can cause an 
uncorrectable error only by upsetting bits in different chips which 
happen to be bits from a single byte - an unlikely event. 
Uncorrectable errors will also occur if several separate SEUs change 
bits in the same byte. To protect against this possibility, DCE software 
must periodically check each byte in the program memory for errors and 
re-write (corrected) bytes which contain SEUs. The period between these 
checks must be smaller than the expected period between SEUs. This is 
called a 'memory wash', and it is part of the main loop in the DCE 
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system software. The main loop executes once in every 32 msec., 
resulting in a complete wash of the program RAM in less than 9 minutes. 
The memory wash algorithm (Table 1) protects the program memory against 
accumulating SEUs and provides an accurate log of the time and memory 
address at which each SEU occurred. (The SEU log is kept in EDAC memory 
and is downlinked to the Command Station using the DCE messaging 
system.) Timestamps, which are read from the UoSAT-2 serial telemetry 
system, are accurate to within 1 minute, but SEU detection time is also 
influenced by the 9-minute wash cycle time. Before this on-board logging 
software was installed DCE SEUs were monitored by noting the hardware 
EDAC counter value during UoSAT-2 passes over the UoS Command Station. 
This resulted in good measurements of total SEU count, but the 
relationship between SEU occurance and satellite orbit location could 
not be studied. The new logging software was loaded in November, 1987, 
and has been operating nearly uninterrupted since then. 
Table 1 
DCE MEMORY WASH ALGORITHM 
Begin Main Loop { 
} 
disable interrupts; 
Save error counter value (N); 
Read the byte from next wash address; 
Save error counter value (M); 
enable interrupts; 
1* If error counter changed during the read, correct and log an 
error. 
*1 
if (n (> m) { 
} 
Write the byte back to the wash address to correct the error; 
Get the time from the telemetry system serial output; 
Log the wash address and the time; 
Set wash address to next location; 
1* The rest of the DCE Main Loop is here. *1 
1* end of Main Loop *1 
3 
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
Error Probabilities 
Table 2 contains the log of SEUs since 10 November, 1987. These results 
reflect SEUs found in 144 kbits of Harris 6564 CMOS static RAM. 
(Although the DCE carries 192 kbits of this memory, 48 kbits had to be 
removed from service in 1986 because of a permanent failure.) There were 
25 bit upsets in the 322-day observational period. There are three 
occurances of 'simultaneous' errors, which are assumed to be the result 
of single cosmic particles. This results in a mean error rate 
22 SEU/(322 days * 144 kbits) = 4.633 X 10-7 SEU/bit/day (1) 
Assuming an underlying Poisson distribution, the 5 to 95% confidence 
band is between 6.529 X 10-7 and 3.370 X 10-7 SEU/bit/day. 
still using the Poisson distribution, we can calculate the probability 
of two independent SEUs occuring within the same 9-minute memory wash 
interval. 
P(9 min) = 9.1 X 10-8 (2) 
For an error to go undetected, two SEUs would have to occur in the same 
wash cycle and in the same byte. The memory size is 12 kbytes, so 
P(undetected) = P(9 min) / 12k = 7.4 X 10-12 (3) 
This demonstrates that the 9-minute wash period is more than adequate to 
protect the DCE program and critical data from multiple bit errors from 
separate SEUs. 
Orbital Position of SEUs 
The SEUs have been plotted against satellite orbital position (Fig. 2). 
Most of the SEUs occurred when UoSAT-2 was traversing the magnetic South 
Atlantic Anomaly (SAA) - a point at which the magnetic field lines dip 
toward the Earth. UoSAT-2 is subject to increased trapped-particle 
radiation in the SAA, and this seems to cause a great increase in the 
SEU rate. This correlation will be studied in detail as more 
experimental data is gathered. 
CONCLUSION 
The UoSAT-2 DCE provides an in-orbit experiment in radiation-induced 
single-event memory upsets. The results of two year's SEU monitoring 
indicate that current hardware and software techniques can easily 
protect satellite computer software and data from SEUs in Harris 6564 
RAMs. The strong correlation between SEUs and the South Atlantic anomaly 
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will be the topic of further investigation, as they are not consistant 
with current SEU simulation software packages. 
Table 2 
SINGLE EVENT UPSET LOG 
EDAC Location 
Count Date Time Address 
--------
1 10-19 01:52:50 7aee 
2 10-25 13:19:11 7b78 
3 11-05 03:25:45 56fe 
4 11-20 21:44:14 7930 
5 11-21 06:01 :21 70cd 
6 11-21 06:01 :21 74ed 
7 01-09 19:07:42 4299 
8 01-09 19:07:42 4499 
9 01-25 18:31 :56 7375 
10 02-01 02:51 :21 7c96 
11 03-17 01: 13: 25 5a15 
12 03-20 02: 06: 15 4998 
13 04-05 23:48:41 74c5 
14 04-30 11 : 02: 11 4402 
15 05-03 02:07:39 5cb9 
16 05-03 04:23:13 562b 
17 05-03 04:23:13 580b 
18 05-14 23:53:35 7de3 
19 05-17 12:01:13 5805 
20 ? ? ? 
21 06-17 01:06:36 45c1 
22 06-17 03: 12: 35 7649 
23 06-29 00:24:14 7641 
24 07-04 01:59:32 5609 
25 08-06 20:07:51 4dc9 
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